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1. Introduction 
Auctioning of conservation contracts to farmers has attracted much attention in recent years. 
Prominent examples of auctioning conservation contracts are the US Conservation Reserve 
Program and the Australian BushTender and EcoTender (Reichelderfer and Boggess 1988, 
Stoneham et al., 2003; Kirwan et al., 2005; Eigenraam et al., 2007). There have been also several 
examples of conservation auctions in Europe in the last decade (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 
2005). Moreover, tendering of conservation contracts has been explicitly recommended in Article 39 
of the EU Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005.  
The attention paid to conservation auctions is based on the widely held belief that competitive 
bidding can enhance the cost-effectiveness of public spending (Gerowitt  et al., 2003). Since 
landholders possess private information about site-specific opportunity costs of conservation 
measures, governments cannot tailor payment rates to each field plot’s cost level (Fraser, 1995). 
On the other hand, offering uniform payments allows landholders with low compliance costs to 
realise information rents. The cost-revelation mechanism of a bidding process has the advantage 
to reduce such rents, though the scale of public cost-savings depends on the specific auction 
design (Stoneham et al., 2003; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2007; Connor et al., 2008).  
An important element in the design of conservation auctions is the selection of an optimal 
information policy. As environmental benefits of conservation measures are usually 
heterogeneous, the government can enhance auction performance if it obtains information on site-
specific environmental scores. However, if the government evaluates site-specific environmental 
benefits, landholders will have an informational disadvantage (Cason and Gangadharan, 2004). 
Disclosing or concealing such information to landholders will affect bidding behaviour and will 
thereby have an influence on auction performance. 
The results of a laboratory experiment undertaken by Cason et al. (2003) suggest that 
government expenses can be saved if information on the environmental scoring is withheld. 
However, an important question is whether these results are specific to the authors’ experimental 
set-up or a finding generally applicable to conservation auctions. To the knowledge of the 
authors, there has been no theoretical study analysing whether either the withdrawal or the 
disclosure of information on conservation benefits is superior. The objective of the present study 
is therefore to extend economic theory for conservation auctions to elaborate conditions for 
efficient information policies.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: after presenting the modelling 
framework, section 3 analyses the performance of an auction in which bids are ranked merely 
based on farmers’ proposed compensation payments. Section 4 considers an auction in which 
environmental programme benefits are included in the bid ranking system while farmers are not 
being informed about their land’s environmental score. Section 5 analyses how revealing 
information on the environmental score may affect bidding, when it does not affect participation. 
The influence of information policy on bidders’ entry decisions is then investigated in section 6. 
To provide a numerical example of how the optimal information policy depends on participation 
and acceptance rate, section 7 applies the modelling framework to a hypothetical conservation 
programme. The article ends with a discussion of the predominant findings.  
 
2. Modelling conservation payment schemes   
Consider a government designing a voluntary conservation programme in order to buy 
environmental services from farmers. An optimal policy mix will maximise a government’s 
welfare (W) with respect to the overall environmental programme contribution (Z) and the 
budgetary outlay (B) of programme payments offered to farmers: 3 
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Note that equation (1) represents a rather general objective function. It reflects the common 
practise of environmental agencies aiming for the maximisation of environmental quality 
improvement with a given budget (Hajkowicz et al., 2007; Connor et al., 2008; Schilizzi and 
Latacz-Lohmann, 2009). It also covers the alternative approach of a government aiming for an 
environmental target with least budgetary outlays. 
Government’s welfare may decrease as payments to farmers are raised (∂W/∂B<0), but 
increase with the overall environmental improvement linked to the programme (∂W/∂Z>0). We 
further assume diminishing marginal rates of substitution between environmental improvement 
(Z) and budget savings (-B), so that the government’s preferences can be depicted by indifference 
curves (Z│W=constant) (figure 1). The government’s welfare will subsequently increase as 
indifference curves are shifted north-westwards (W2>W1>W0). 
 












Assume that farmers have full information on their own land’s conservation costs, whereas the 
government is not able to estimate site-specific per acre costs. Opportunity costs involved with 
participating in a programme are usually heterogeneous since they depend on natural conditions 
and farmers’ management skills. Naturally, farmers do therefore have an informational advantage 
over the government with regard to the compliance costs of their own land. 
Information asymmetry may also arise in the context of environmental programme benefits, 
which do usually depend on location-specific factors and thereby vary across field plots. In the 
absence of reliable valuation studies, environmental benefits can often not be expressed in 
monetary terms. Per acre environmental benefits (z) may therefore be represented by a 
dimensionless index composed of several environmental attributes such as water, biodiversity, 
soil or atmospheric quality. A dimensionless aggregate measure of environmental quality has 
been applied in numerous conservation auctions in practice (Stoneham et al., 2003; Kirwan et al., 
2005; Connor et al., 2008; Rolfe and Windle, 2006). Even if farmers are able to estimate the 
relative performance of land participating in the programme with regard to some of those 
attributes, the government can keep an informational advantage since it determines their relative 
weight. We consider a simplified asymmetric informational structure of a government being able 
to obtain full information on environmental quality changes, whereas farmers cannot obtain any 
a-priori information on site-specific environmental scores.  
We choose a fixed payment scheme (FPS) as a benchmark for analysing the relative economic 
performance of conservation auctions. The analysis of an optimal environmental payment scheme 
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will be based on the diagrammatic modelling framework of figure 1 and 2. The eligible area for 
programme participation is given by a , while the per acre compliance costs (c) of programme 
participation, ranging between c and c , are given by the solid line (figure 2). Site-specific 
environmental scores, ranging between z  and z , are not correlated with per acre conservation 
costs and indicated by the dotted area.
1  
Since programme participation is voluntary, the total area participating in a FPS will be 
determined by the land quantity at which the per acre payment s equals farmers’ compliance costs 
( c s  ). For example, if the government offers a per acre payment of p2, area a2 will be 
subscribed to the programme (figure 2). The relevant budget outlay for the government is 
characterised by area 0a2Kp2, whereas the overall environmental benefit can be obtained by 
aggregating the environmental scores of each acre (z) participating in the programme, illustrated 
by the rectangle  z QS z . Note that the aggregated environmental score is not identical to the size 
of that rectangle. The dots within that rectangle do merely indicate the environmental scores that 
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The total number (i) of field plots participating in the conservation programme is 
characterised by n, while mi represents each field plot’s size. 














Let the combination of programme outlay (area 0a2Kp2, figure 2) and environmental 
improvement (area  z QS z , figure 2) correspond with B3 and Z(a2) (point X2 in figure 1). If the 
government offers a higher payment rate (p4), and thereby raises the programme outlay to B5 
(area 0a3Fp4), it will be able to reach a higher environmental quality level Z(a3), as indicated by 
the dots within area  z TR z  (figure 2). The combination of B5 and Z(a3) corresponds with point X5 
in figure 1. Given that total budget expenditures will increase relatively stronger than 
environmental quality if per acre payment rates are raised, the relationship between Z and B 
resulting from a FPS must follow a concave transformation curve (dashed curve in figure 1). 
                                                 
1 Note that the information asymmetry would no longer exist if c and z were strongly correlated, which would make 
the analysis of an optimal environmental policy redundant. 
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Given that point X2 (figure 1) coincides with the tangency of the transformation and indifference 
curve, p2 represents the welfare maximising per acre payment rate the government may offer 
when implementing a FPS.  
3. Auctioning conservation contracts  
Next, we will analyse how auctioning of conservation contracts may enhance the economic 
performance of the conservation policy. We consider a discriminatory sealed bid auction in 
which each farmer can submit a financial bid (b), a proposed per acre compensation payment for 
land subscribed to the conservation programme. While the government aims for low bids to 
reduce budgetary costs (B), farmers face the trade-off that the submission of low bids will 
enhance the chance of bid acceptance, but also decrease their potential net pay-off from 
programme participation. Farmers’ perceived probability of bid acceptance can be derived from 
their expectations on the ex-post chosen bid cap b
~ , the maximal per acre payment the 
government is willing to make. For simplicity, we assume symmetry so that all bidders have the 
same expectation of the bid cap. Building upon Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort’s 
(1997) analysis, the optimal bid (
* b ) of risk-neutral farmers can be written as: 
(3)      c b h b H b    1
*   
where  b b H b h    / ) ( ) ( denotes the density function of the expected bid cap. Equation (3) suggests 
that optimal bids generally exceed per acre compliance costs (c) to ensure a positive expected net 
pay-off from programme participation. Bids will be larger the higher farmers’ compliance costs, 
but will not exceed the expected maximum bid cap b  at which the probability of bid acceptance 
is zero (hence  b b c  
* ).  
Consider that bidders’ expected maximum bid cap is given at a rather high level ( 4 p b  ), so 
that the optimal bid curve  ) ( 4
* p b b   is located between the expected maximum bid cap ( 4 p ) and 
farmers compliance costs c (figure 2). If the government fixes the ex-post chosen maximal 
acceptable bid at  4
~
p b  , all submitted bids will be accepted, leading to a total conservation area 
of a3. The associated combination of environmental quality Z(a3) and budget expenditures of B4  
(area 0a3FD) corresponds with point X4  (figure 1). Hence, an auction will be superior to a FPS 
because the environmental output Z(a3) can be reached with lower costs (B4  rather B5).  
Nevertheless, an auction will not necessarily perform better than a FPS. If the government 
aims for a less ambitious environmental target (Z(a2)) it may choose an ex-post bid cap of 
3
~
p b   
(figure 2). As a result, the programme outlay (area 0a2GD) may coincide with that linked to a 
fixed per acre payment of p2 (point X2 in figure 1). An auction will perform worse than a FPS if 
the government tries to reach an environmental quality improvement of only Z(a1) (point X6 in 
figure 1). The relevant ex-post bid cap of an auction will be given at  2
~
p b   (figure 2), whereas a 
payment of  1 p s   will be sufficient to reach Z(a1) within a FPS (figure 2). We conclude that the 
transformation frontier of an auction approach (for given farmers’ expectations) does intersect 
that of a FPS (figure 1). The transformation curve of an auction is concave since programme 
expenditures (B) increase more than proportionally as environmental output (Z) is raised. 
Notice further that the relative performance of an auction is determined by farmers’ 
expectations about the bid-cap. The diagrammatic model (figure 1 and 2) illustrates that lower 
expectations of the maximum bid cap will  enhance the performance of an auction, since an 
environmental quality target can be achieved with a lower programme outlay. Lower expectations 
are illustrated by a south-west shift of an auction’s transformation curve (figure 1). For instance, 6 
 
if bidders’ expected maximum bid cap is 
2 p b  , the environmental quality of Z(a2) can be reached 
by choosing an ex-post bid cap of 
2
~
p b  . The associated budget expenditures (area 0a2KA in 
figure 2) will be lower than that of the relevant FPS (comparison between X1 and X2 in figure 1).  
Low expectations will also lead to lower participation rates since farmers will only participate 
in an auction if per acre costs are not higher than the expected maximum bid cap ( b c ). 
Subsequently, given an expected maximum bid cap of  2 p b  , the government will not be able to 
enhance environmental quality beyond Z(a2). Hence, while an auction has the potential to 
enhance the economic performance of agri-environmental payments, a FPS may turn out to be 
superior if farmers’ expectations are either too high or too low. 
4. Obtaining information on site-specific environmental benefits  
The previous section considered that accepted bids are selected merely on the basis of proposed 
payments (b). This is relevant, if the government has no knowledge of site-specific environmental 
benefits of programme participation. We will now extend Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort’s (1997) analysis by demonstrating that gathering of information on site-specific 
environmental benefits may enhance the economic performance of auctions.  
Obtaining information on site-specific environmental scores allows the government to apply a 
two-dimensional (I(z,b)) rather than a one-dimensional scoring index (b). A widespread approach 
in conservation auctions has been to use a scoring system which relates environmental benefits to 
programme outlays (Stoneham et al., 2003; Eigenraam et al., 2007; Greenhalgh et al., 2008; 
Windle and Rolfe, 2008; Connor et al., 2008). A scoring system I=z/b involves that the 
probability of bid acceptance increases with a higher bid index. Bids will only be accepted if they 
exceed an ex-post chosen critical index I
~.  
Analysing the influence of information on bidding behaviour requires a modified modelling 
framework. Let us therefore depict combinations of financial bid (b) and environmental score 
(dotted area between z  and z  in figure 3):  













Assume that, in the scenario without information on z (one-dimensional scoring system), a bid 
cap will be chosen which coincides with the optimal bid linked to the cost level c ˆ, hence 
 c b b ˆ ~ *   (line SG in figure 3). The auctioneer will thereby accept all combinations of b and z 
within rectangle JSGM (figure 3) leading to total budget expenditures of:  
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Consider now that the government has obtained information on z and applies a two-dimensional 
scoring index (I=z/b). Given the same budget constraint B , the iso-score curve representing the 
critical scoring index below which bids will be rejected (line 0U) must lie between points S and 
G, hence   c b z I k ˆ tan
~ *     where  z z z k    (figure 3). An auctioneer applying a two-
dimensional bid scoring system would thereby accept all combinations of b and z within area 
JXUM (figure 3). Hence, when taking the one-dimensional bid scoring system as a comparison, 
bidders with relative high z/b ratios will be included (area LUG), while those with relative low 
z/b ratios (area SLX) will be excluded. We infer that the government can reach a higher aggregate 
environmental quality with the same budget (or alternatively the same environmental target with 
least public expenditures), which is illustrated as a leftward shift from the dashed to the solid 
transformation curve (figure 4a): 









5. Bidding with and without information on the environmental score 
Let us now turn to the question of how bidding will be affected by different information policies. 
By neglecting the relevance of participation decisions, we provide a theoretical explanation for 
Cason et al.’s experimental finding that withholding information on site-specific environmental 
benefits may enhance auction performance. Later, in the following section, we demonstrate how 
auction performance is affected if an information policy’s impact on entry decisions is 
considered. 
If farmers’ bids are accepted, their net pay-off per acre is given by the difference between 
proposed per acre payments (b) and costs (c). When applying a two-dimensional scoring index, 
the probability of bid acceptance (p) becomes a function of b and z: 
(5)    

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where  I
~ characterizes the ex-post chosen critical bid index below which bids will be rejected and 
I I F I f    / ) ( ) (  the expected density function of I
~. The expected net-gain of bidders not being 
informed on site-specific z-values can thereby be formulated as follows:  
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When specifying farmers’ expected density function of the environmental score (g(z)) and the 
critical scoring index (f(I)), the optimal bids    c b
*  of risk-neutral uninformed bidders can be 
derived from equation (6).
2 For example, let us consider uniform distribution functions for the 
scoring index (   
1 
   I I I I I F ) and the environmental quality index (   
1     z z z z z G ). 




















    
By maximizing (7) for b we get the optimal bid of uninformed bidders: 




Let us now analyse how the optimal bid will change when bidders are being informed on their 
land’s environmental score. We consider that bidders are aware of the two-dimensional scoring 
index I=z/b. The expected net pay-off from auction participation is then given by:  
(9)      c b z b I F E   , ] [     
Applying the first-order conditions of a local maximum ( 0 / ] [    b E  ), the optimal bid of a risk-
neutral informed bidder can be written as: 
(10)    
 b I z b I f
z b I F
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If we assume the same uniform distribution for b and z as above, the optimal bid of an informed 
bidder (
* * b ) becomes:
6 
(11)   I cz z c b  ,
* *
     A comparison between equations (11) and (8) demonstrates that bidders being aware that they 
have an average environmental score (E[z]) would submit the same bid as if they were 
uninformed. However, since the optimal bid of informed bidders will increase as z increases (
0 /
* *    z b ), landholders with more than average z-values will increase their proposed payments, 
while those with lower than average z-value will reduce bids.  
Optimal bids for uninformed (
* b ) and informed bidders (
* * b ) linked to the cost level c ˆ are 
illustrated by line SG and TR, respectively (figure 3). The positive slope of the bid curve 
* * b  (line 
TR) indicates that farmers who get to know the environmental scores of their land will increase 
their bid if  k z z   and lower it if  k z z  . Let zk denote the environmental score at which proposed 
payments of informed and uninformed are identical ( ) , ˆ ( ) ˆ (
* * *
k z c b c b  ). Notice that  zk may not 
necessarily coincide with E[z] if we assume other than uniform distributions of F(I) and G(z).  
We can now demonstrate that an auctioneer will usually be better off by concealing 
information on site-specific environmental benefits, when maintaining the assumption of a fixed 
participation rate. The reason is that bids with the highest z/b ratios will be accepted first whereas 
low  z/b ratio bids will only be accepted if the budget is sufficiently large. To illustrate the 
superiority of information concealment, let us focus on bidders with the compliance cost level c ˆ 
(figure 3). Assume that bidders not being informed about their land’s environmental score submit 
the bid   c b ˆ
* , indicated by line SG (figure 3). If the auctioneer chose a critical scoring index of 
                                                 
2 Note that farmers’ expected distribution may not necessarily correspond with actual distributions of z and I. 9 
 
) , ˆ (
~ * * z c b z I   below which bids are rejected, only z/b combinations along line GN would be 
accepted (figure 3). Revealing information on site specific values of z would shift the bidding 
curve from SG to TR. Hence, when applying the same critical scoring index  ) , ˆ (
~ * * z c b z I  , no bids 
could be accepted. The auctioneer would therefore need to lower the critical scoring index I
~ and 
thus accept bids with a worse z/b ratio. Hence, we conclude that the revelation of information on 
z-values would lead to a right-ward shift of an auctions’ transformation curve (from the solid to 
the dotted line in figure 4a).  
As the programme outlay is gradually increased so that more and more bids will be accepted, 
the relative advantage of information concealment becomes smaller, indicated by the converging 
of the transformation curves (figure 4a). A higher acceptance rate involves that more bidders with 
low z/b ratios ( k z z  ) will be accepted. However, these are the bidders who will reduce their 
proposed payments and thereby raise the z/b ratios as a result of information revelation. Hence, if 
all bids are accepted ( ) ˆ (
~ * c b z I  ), both information policies may lead to similar budget 
expenditures.
3  
Note that the superiority of information concealment is only guaranteed if the bidding curve 
for informed bidders (line TR) is generally steeper sloped than any iso-index line (I=constant) 
intersecting it. This implies that disclosing information on site specific z-values will induce z/b 
ratios of bids associated with low environmental benefits ( k z z  ) (line TL in figure 3) not to 
increase beyond the bid score of non-informed bidders’ land that is associated with high 
environmental benefits ( k z z  ) (line GL in figure 3). Let us therefore provide the following 
proof:  
May b(p,z) denote the inverse of the probability of bid acceptance  )
~
) , ( ( ) , ( I z b I P z b p   . As 
long as that combinations of financial bid (b) and environmental score (zi, zj) lead to the same bid 
score, the associated probability of bid acceptance must be the same. We can therefore derive the 
following relationships:  
(12)  ) , ( ) , ( j
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Maximising a bidder’s expected net pay-off ( ) ) , ( ( c z p b p    ) with respect to the probability 
of bid acceptance (p) requires the first-order condition:  
(14) 
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* may represent the probability which maximises a bidder’s expected net pay-off. By 
inserting (12) and (13) into (14) and resolving for p, we derive: 
(15)   


















                                                 
3 When assuming uniform distribution functions for I and z, the average bid of an informed bidder will be lower than 
that of an uninformed bidder. This is because the optimal bid will increase less than proportionally as the 
environmental score is raised, given that the second derivative of (11) with respect to z is negative: 
 0 4
3 2 2      z I c z b . The reverse might be given if alternative distribution functions of I and z are considered. 10 
 
Rational bidders will propose compensation payments larger than compliance costs (b>c). 
Hence, equation (15) must take a value greater than one for zi > zj. The probability of bid 
acceptance linked to a risk neutral farmer’s optimal bid will therefore increase with the z-value, 
provided that  0  c . Since a higher probability of bid acceptance is associated with a higher 
scoring index I, the bidding curve for informed bidders (line TR) must consequently be steeper 
sloped than any iso-index line  intersecting it. 
6. Influence of entry decision on auction performance 
Next, we analyse how auction performance is affected if changes in information policy influence 
the participation rate. For simplicity, we focus on farmers facing per acre cost levels of either  1 c  
or  2 c  (figure 5). May both groups of farmers expect the bid cap to be not higher than b  and the 
ex-post chosen critical scoring index to be not below  b z I k  , when information on environmental 
scores is concealed. As a consequence, farmers facing cost level  1 c  may choose the bid  ) ( 1
* c b  (line 
UG), whereas farmers with  2 c  will not participate in the auction. The reason is that rational 
farmers will only submit bids, if their expected maximal bid cap is higher than compliance costs 
of project participation ( b c  ).  













If farmers are informed on site-specific z-values, the bid curve linked to the cost level c1 will shift 
from UG to DF (figure 5). If farmers’ environmental score is below  i z , they will not be able to 
reach the expected minimal scoring index  b z I k   and thereby abstain from the auction. On the 
other hand, the disclosure of information on z may convince landholders with high environmental 
scores to participate in the tender, who would not do so if information were concealed. For 
example, farmers with cost level  2 c  and site-specific environmental benefits of  j z z   would now 
offer bids characterised by line LM. The associated z/b ratios are higher than that of the iso-index 
line  b z I k    and thereby also higher than many offers (along line TG) that would be otherwise 
submitted by uninformed farmers facing the cost level  1 c  (figure 5).  
Several insights can be derived from this analysis. If a small budget is spent, withdrawing 
information on z-values will still be more efficient than information revelation. This is because 
more bids will be included by moving from point U to E rather than by moving from F to E 
(figure 5). However, if budget expenditures are rather large, so that bids linked to cost level  2 c  
F 
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will be accepted, providing information on z-values can enhance auction performance. The 
transformation curve corresponding with the revelation of information on z (dotted line, figure 
4b) will thus intersect with the transformation curve linked to information concealment (solid 
line, figure 4b).  
We conclude that the provision of information on site-specific conservation benefits can 
enhance an auctions’ economic performance. It may occur when landholders’ expectations of the 
bid cap are so low that not all eligible plots will be offered, and when a rather large share of the 
submitted bids is accepted. In other words, the lower landholders’ expectations of the bid cap (i.e. 
the fewer eligible field plots participate in the auction) and the larger the proportion of submitted 
bids that will be accepted, the more likely it is that disclosing information is superior to 
concealing it. The break-even line indicating combinations of acceptance and participation rates 
at which both information policies yield the same results, must therefore reach from south-west 
to north-east, when plotting participation rates against acceptance rates (figure 6a). 
7.  Numerical analysis: Monte Carlo simulation  
To assess the relevance of the theoretical findings discussed in the previous section, we analyse 
the optimal information policy within a hypothetical conservation auction. A Monte Carlo 
simulation of a conservation auction is conducted with 1000 potential bidders. Per acre 
opportunity costs linked to conservation measures vary between zero and 400€, while site-
specific environmental scores are assumed to range between  10  z  and  400  z . Opportunity 
costs for each of the landholders are randomly chosen from an approximated normal probability 
distribution
4, while environmental scores are considered to be uniformly distributed. By 
assuming also a uniform distribution for the expected critical bid score (I
~), farmers’ optimal bids 
for the different information policies can be derived from equations (8) and (11).  
By ranking bids according to the relevant scoring system, we can derive transformation 
functions for the policies “information withdrawal” and “information disclosure” (figure 4b). For 
each run we calculate the acceptance rate at which both information policies lead to the same 
combination of budget expenditures (B) and environmental benefit (Z) (point X in figure 4b). The 
simulation is replicated 4,000 times. Since farmers’ expectations on the expected minimal critical 
bid score I  are varied between different runs, each simulation may lead to a different 
participation rate.  
Results are presented in figure 6. Each dot (figure 6a) corresponds to an acceptance rate at 
which both information policies perform equally (point X in figure 4b). Each observation in 
figure 6a does thereby represent a break-even combination of participation and acceptance rate. 
The trend of all observation is given by the solid line (figure 6a). The area below the trend line 
can therefore be interpreted such that it characterises combinations for which information 
concealment is expected to be the superior policy (figure 6a). For participation/ acceptance rate 
combinations above the trend line, the government should be better-off by making site-specific 
environmental benefits public.  
To analyse the robustness of the results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. 
Participation/acceptance rate combinations are calculated at which information concealment 
either decreases or increases budgetary costs by 10% (dashed lines in figure 6a). The results 
indicate that relatively small deviations from the break-even line may already lead to significant 
budgetary costs savings when selecting the optimal rather than the sub-optimal policy.  
                                                 
4 A normal distribution is approximated by adding four uniformly distributed random variables. 12 
 
Next, we alter the distribution functions for the opportunity costs of programme participation. 
The break-even trend line linked to normally distributed costs is depicted by the solid line in 
figure 6b. When farmers’ costs follow a triangle distribution, the break-even trend line shifts to 
the dashed line, whereas uniform distributed compliance costs lead to the dotted break-even trend 
line (figure 6b). The results suggest that the distribution of bidders’ opportunity costs has a strong 
influence on the selection of an optimal information policy.  
Figure 6: Monte Carlo simulation: Comparison of different information policies  
        a)                     b) 
            
8. Conclusions  
The present study analyses optimal information policies based on a conservation auction model 
for two-dimensional bid-scoring. Conditions under which either concealing or revealing of 
information on site-specific conservation benefits maximises an auctioneer’s welfare are 
elaborated. The analysis demonstrates that information concealment will usually be preferable if 
entry decisions are not relevant. The study does thereby provide a theoretical explanation for 
Cason  et al.’s (2003) experimental result. However, we demonstrate that information 
concealment is not generally superior to information revelation. An auctioneer can be better-off 
by revealing information because it may motivate farmers to participate in the auction who would 
not do so otherwise. Low participation rates do therefore increase the probability that information 
revelation will be superior to information concealment.  
The analysis of optimal bids is based on the assumption that landholders behave risk-neutral. 
Risk-neutrality was considered to be appropriate in the context of a theoretical study, given that 
the specification of an optimal bid of risk-averse bidders would need to rely on rather restrictive 
assumptions. When considering risk-aversion rather than risk-neutrality, optimal proposed 
payments would tend to be lower for both information policies. Because concealment of 
information on environmental benefits introduces a further element of uncertainty in the bidding 
process, one may speculate that considering risk-aversion rather than risk-neutrality might 
improve the relative performance of information concealment. The break-even line might 
therefore shift north-westwards (figure 6). However, it is questionable whether risk-aversion may 
lead to a situation where information withdrawal will be generally superior. We suggest 
laboratory experiments with risk-averse probands to test the influence of risk attitude on auction 
performance. Such experiments may also incorporate the different kinds of transaction costs 
which may influence landholder’s decision to abstain or participate in a conservation auction.
 Acceptance rate 
Information  
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